CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM (CR) is an attempt to overcome the difficulties associated with naïve REALISM and radical constructivism. There are different versions for CR. In this paper, I defend a particular version of CR. Complexity of reality, on the one hand, and the impact of human mind, language, and culture, on the other, leads to the inevitable contribution of constructs in knowledge development. According to the CR, even if mental, linguistic and cultural side of constructs could not be avoided in principle, a certain proportion of reality-contact can be considered and defended for the constructs. In this sense, human mind and culture has a constitutive role to play in knowledge acquiring instead of being an innocent means in the process of acquiring knowledge. On the other hand, the role played by the reality in this process cannot be ignored because, according to the CR, knowledge consists after all of knowing 'something' in the real world. On the whole, taking into account both the constitutive role of mind and culture, on the one hand, and the inevitable role of the reality, on the other, shows the difference between the CR and pure REALISM, pure constructivism, and those versions of CR that do not take the constitutive role of mind into account.There are requirements for the CR in science education. First of all, there must be a constant caution for making sure that our scientific theories have caught the proportion of reality-contact. This point shows the difference between the CR and pure constructivism. This caution should be present in our science teaching as well. Secondly, we should encourage our students to develop imaginative alternative constructs when they are learning sciences. This shows the difference between the CR with naïve realists who ignore the importance of students' imaginations in suggesting alternative constructs. Notwithstanding, while we encourage the students to develop their imaginative constructs, there should be considered a limitation for their over-justification about their constructs. In this way, we as teachers should urge them to take counter-evidence most seriously into account. This is a point in which CONSTRUCTIVE realists are distinguished from pragmatists too. Pragmatists do not give up their theories in confrontation with counter-evidence but rather look for almost limitless changes in their constructs in order for making the counter-evidence compatible with their theories, whereas CONSTRUCTIVE realists will be ready to take counter-evidence more serious and correct their constructs accordingly.

This paper concerns on the scientific approach to Nature; especially in general mean as a part of universal knowledge. Through this paper it is perceived that the Constructivism started a critical argument on the western scientific traditions. Constructivism specter in approach to Nature perceives interconnectivity between Nature and Culture. This is one of the facts that CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM tries to face by using an approach to culture and scientific proposition that shows extensively in universal means any proposition could only achieve to its ideal conception when it is strangified to different culture. So it comes to the state in which there is no exact answer to the questions which related to the value of Nature; and reminding that nature could not be regarded as a knowable norm. So if we do not know the structure of the Natural world any attempt to replace it or a part of it with any artificial world could be a dangerous enterprise. Those ideas are followed in sample study of rice production and the rites and related ceremonies in Japan.

European Union is one of the most important and the most prominent actors of international system which is among the most effective and the most successful actors in order to provide international peace and security, and to make regional integration. Due to the importance of mutual relations between Islamic Republic of Iran and European Union, at this survey, we try to study the principles of European Union’s foreign policy toward Islamic Republic of Iran by using library method and reviewing written sources. Also this survey tries to find a suitable answer for the question that what were different approaches of foreign policy between these two actors during the history? By the assumption that in recent years the emphasis of Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy toward the west was changed based on CONSTRUCTIVE interaction, our studies show that after negotiations between two sides, and in the shadow of removing sanctions and the return of political space based on CONSTRUCTIVE interaction, there will be a platform to reduce obstacles in front of political relations, and to start a new era in front of European Union and Islamic Republic of Iran.

The method of metaphysics: Metaphysics is empirical but depends not, like the sciences, on recondite experience but on close attention to aspects of everyday experience we ordinarily scarcely notice. "Real" is a broader concept than "exists" (which applies only to particulars) and also applies to phenomena, kinds, and laws, which are real, but not, of course, existent entities. But "there are real kinds, laws, etc." doesn't imply that all the kinds and laws we believe are real, are. I call my approach "Innocent REALISM" because--though it's certainly not naive--it requires attending to experience, so far as possible, without substantial preconceptions. There is one real world, enormously varied but also integrated. It includes physical stuff, kinds, laws, etc. and, here on earth, a vast array of human artifacts, physical, social, intellectual, and imaginative, all intimately interconnected. All this requires human mindedness (a better word than "mind" because it doesn't suggest that human mentality is an organ like the heart or the liver). Rather, it's a complex congeries of dispositions and abilities: to understand even such a relatively simple thing as what's involved in someone's believing something, we need to take account of the person's dispositions to behavior, verbal and otherwise; to the neurophysiological realizations of these dispositions; and to their connections to the world and to words in the person's linguistic community--this last requiring other people's words-world connection. "Virtual" reality is just one more computer artifact, clever, no doubt, but not metaphysically startling. It's oversold, but this is advertising hype, not serious metaphysics.

In CONSTRUCTIVE empiricism Van Fraassen intends to defend the epistemological distinction between truth and empirical adequacy as well as between cognitive belief and pragmatic acceptance, based on epistemological distinction between observable entities and unobservable entities. Some of the critics not only disagree with these two epistemological distinctions, but also opposed to the mentioned basic epistemological distinction. Although van Fraassen himself with a linguistic evasiveness accepts the ambiguousness of the observable predicate of some entities such as molecule in order to sympathize with these critics, he considers some entities such as electron as definitely unobservable without providing any clear criteria and insists on the mentioned basic distinction. The present paper intends to argue that one can defend the basic epistemological distinction based on the epistemological limit of perception (vision) and the criteria of presence or absence of the observable refrence to the naked eye. Consequently, in order to reject the epistemological distinction between truth and empirical adequacy as well as between cognitive belief and pragmatic acceptance, Van Fraassen’s critics should appeal to some argument other than denying the epistemological distinction between observable entities and unobservable entities.

For many years, history has been an important component of secondary and high school curricula. Various philosophical assumptions affect the development of history syllabi and its teaching methodology. On the one hand, such assumptions concern the nature of human being; on the other hand, they concentrate on the nature of historical knowledge. This paper aims to formulate new objectives for history curriculum according to an Islamic standpoint. Firstly, epistemological foundations are examined in order to justify this viewpoint. CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM is a philosophical approach to historical knowledge, according to which historical knowledge is a product of human thinking about the real, historical events. Also, it considers human beings as agents who can make subjective constructs in order to capture the real, historical events and to provide consistent explanations of them. If a historian achieves to provide such an explanation, it can be claimed that s/he has approximated reality.Then, objectives of history curriculum are reformulated in accordance with the Islamic objectives of education and within the framework of CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM. This study follows progressive analytic research methodology in which philosophical objectives and foundations are analyzed and elaborated. Two major objectives of history curriculum are identified consequently: to achieve historical knowledge and insight, and to develop the ability for influential social contribution. The realization of any of these two objectives respectively leads to more achievements: 1) acquaintance with historical reality, 2) cognition of different historical explanations, and 3) acquaintance with the Islamic perspective on the philosophy of history. Moreover, three procedural goals are necessary to realize the first objective: 1) examination of historical documents, 2) re-enactment of historical events, and 3) evaluation of historical explanations. The realized goals of the second objective are: 1) adoptation of a historical perspective, and 2) the ability of deducing limited generalizations from the past for the future.

In modem literature, the condition of mankind is depicted using elements such as abnormality and folly. REALISM, which tries to depict reality, is the literature of modem era in contemporary times. REALISM is not only a style among other literary schools, but it is also the rudiment of literature, for other literary styles, particulary in recent centuries, have originated from reality or is conspicuously related to it. One can clearly witness this aspect of REALISM in the works of Franz Kafka, Thomas Mann and Bertold Brecht. Therefore, regarding authors ideology and choice of styles in their works, they are in and/or should deal with a very crucial and grave condition.

Hilary Putnam, who was once one of the representatives and proponents of scientific and metaphysical REALISM, became an unrelenting opponent of metaphysical REALISM during the mid-70s. Having argued against alethic and ontological dimensions of metaphysical REALISM, he proposed “internal REALISM” as an alternative to it. Putnam’s major objection to the alethic dimension of metaphysical REALISM was that this philosophy brings about an unbridgeable gap between the truth of a proposition and our epistemic justifications for it. As to the ontological dimension of metaphysical REALISM, he proposed the criticism to the effect that according to this philosophical position the world consists of “readymade” objects. Putnam poses these criticisms because, as he argues, firstly, truth cannot be considered anything but the ideal justification; and secondly, the world is not made of ready-made objects, but rather it is we that cut up the world into different objects when we take a conceptual scheme. Indeed, according to Putnam assuming any “external perspective”, whether about truth or about ontology, is meaningless. Having introduced and reviewed Putnam’s arguments in rejecting metaphysical REALISM, this article explains and examines the basic elements of internal REALISM. The results of this article show that Putnam’s objections against metaphysical REALISM lack the necessary credibility and strength; and at the same time his proposed alternative (internal REALISM) has serious problems that made to be addressed. By his chosen conception of truth, internal REALISM, cannot touch its stated purpose; i.e. the removal of a huge gap between the truth of a statement and our knowledge of it. The ontological claims of internal REALISM are not, indeed, the reliable and true consequences of the thesis of conceptual relativity, which is considered as Putnam’s main base in this regard, but rather it is more a consequence of mistaking the linguistic issues with ontological ones.

Among the most basic discussions in epistemology are those related to ideas and concepts. In the present writing, we are trying to find out the features of theoretical concepts or terms as well as observational concepts. We are to find out whether the theoretical concepts are true concepts in principle or untrue ones like fairy tales and monsters or conventional concepts. In other words, must we choose REALISM or unREALISM in the realm of theoretical concepts? What about the realm of observational concepts? And finally, what is the status of such concepts in the classification system of concepts and ideas? Undoubtedly, this discussion is among the most important and most basic epistemological discussions in the realm of concepts and ideas, through which the scientific propositions, laws and theories are organized. In the present study, we explore such a difficulty and pursue the related solution.

The realization of knowledge in the form of naïve REALISM and critical REALISM has been one of main concerns of philosophers. Correspondence theory, which is considered as theory of truth in transcendental philosophy (Al Hekmah al-mota'aliya), can be interpreted as either naïve REALISM or critical REALISM. Problems of transcendental philosophy are presented in a way that evidence can be provided for both interpretations. Given the incompatibility of the two interpretations, only one should be chosen as Mulla Sadra's final theory. Given that within the framework of transcendental philosophy Naïve REALISM faces many serious criticism and problems, and that Mulla Sadra's final theories and strong evidence provided by transcendental philosophy are more consistent with critical REALISM, it seems that it is more appropriate to consider critical REALISM as Mulla Sadra's final theory.